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Supreme Court Says Government Must Prove Defendant Knew Drug was Illegal

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Drug Crimes, Bath Salt
Must Prove Defendant
Knew Drug was Illegal

Drug Crimes

Defendant claimed "he did not know the “bath salts” he was distributing were regulated as controlled substance analogues . . . ." Court said "Government [must] establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with a substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act . . . ."


Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Decided June 18, 2015

         

Review - Law Office of W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr

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Had I not found Casey and his team, I would have been extradited from Tennessee to Florida on a 25 year old warrant. Casey and his team got my charges dropped and the warrant cancelled. They were compassionate, diligent in their work, and did their homework on my case. If you need an attorney, Casey is AAA+++.
Jim M.

Trafficking in Drugs | Oxycodone | 813-222-2220 Quick Facts

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 oxycodone trafficking,  trafficking. oxycodone
Trafficking in Drugs | Oxycodone | Quick Facts
Oxycodone Drug  Charges by the Numbers

Annual Statistics 2012:


  • 3/4 convicted of oxycodone trafficking were male.
  • 2/3 were White (67.0%) followed by Black (22.6%), Hispanic (8.2%) and Other Races (2.3%).
  • 37 years average age .
  • 96.8 percent United States citizens
  • 50 percent little or no prior criminal record
  • 497 and 1,990 30-milligram pills of oxycodone median quantity
  • 10.5% of all offenders were a minor or minimal participant
  • 93.1 percent of oxycodone trafficking cases sentenced to imprisonment
  • 57.1 months average sentence length for oxycodone traffickers

oxycodone trafficking, trafficking. oxycodone

Source: http://www.ussc.gov/Quick_Facts/Quick_Facts_Oxycodone_Trafficking.pdf


Two Tampa Area Growhouse Busts in One Week

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Hillsborough County, Florida cops are busy this week. Two growhouse busts over the past week by the Tampa Police Department and the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office. The marijuana weighed approximately 75.3 pounds in the Tampa bust. 358 pounds nabbed by the Sheriff.




 10728 Deepbrook Dr Riverview, FL 33569

Source: http://www.baynews9.com/content/news/baynews9/news/article.html/content/news/articles/bn9/2015/10/30/riverview_grow_house.html

 1716 E Navajo Ave Tampa, FL 33612 

Source: http://www.tbo.com/news/crime/raid-uncovers-60-pot-plants-in-tampa-grow-house-deputies-say-20151105/

Marijuana Drug Crimes Defense Attorney Video



PREVIOUS TAMPA GROWHOUSE COVERAGE



Trafficking in Cannabis 25 to 2,000 Pounds | First Degree ...


www.drug2go.com/2010/09/trafficking-in-cannabis-25-to-2000.html

 Rating: 4.9 - ‎Review by Google+
... all drug cases, grow house cases and covers developments in drug rehabilitation programs. ... Drug Trafficking Defense Attorney Lawyer in Tampa, Florida ...


Marijuana Tampa Grow House Bust

www.drug2go.com/2009/01/marijuana-tampa-grow-house-bust.html

 Rating: 4.9 - ‎Review by Google+
Jan 7, 2009 - $1 million in marijuana seized from Valrico grow house according to ... cultivation and trafficking of the estimated 235 pounds of marijuana.


Grow House Video of the Day - Underground Growhouse

www.drug2go.com/2011/.../grow-house-video-of-day-underground.htm...

 Rating: 4.9 - ‎Review by Google+
Feb 22, 2011 - We recall there was an underground grow house bust in Tampa, Florida, but this .... Trafficking 4 to 14 Grams Morphine, Opium, Oxycodone, ...

Can a Florida drug overdose Grant Immunity From criminal prosecution?

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Usually the answer is "no" However, one recent case involved a victim who was found to be impaired, but not overdosed from heroin. The cop noticed the patient had signs of intoxication that included bloodshot eyes, rambling speech, and swaying. The patient told the deputy that he was taking medication. 

Florida Statute 893.21(2), Marchman Act, Florida Statute 397.675, overdose, immunity
Drug overdose in Florida can
immunize from prosecution under
Florida Statute 893.21(2)

Victim of Drug Overdose?


The cop saw a syringe hanging out of his pocket. The patient's mother was there and was concerned that the patient have been using drugs. The patient was taken into custody under the Marchman Act. Florida Statute 397. This Florida Drug Law provides for involuntary commitment of people who are in danger due to drugs or alcohol. The police took the patient to a drug treatment facility. He was not held or hospitalized. 

Charged with Possession of Heroin


The prosecutors charged him with possession of heroin and one lower-level court had dismissed the case based on Florida Statute 893.1.(2) that has a provision to immunize persons who have experienced a drug-related overdose. The higher court ruled that while the patient was impaired and taken into custody under the Marchman Act, Florida Statute 397.675, he was not the victim of an overdose. 

Definition of Overdose in Florida Drug Laws


The court look to the definition of drug overdose and found that an overdose meant that it was too great a deuce of a therapeutic agent or a lethal or toxic amount of a drug overdose. Overdose has almost been defined as an excessive and dangerous dose of a drug. The court found the patient was not immune from prosecution, as he showed signs of drug impairment but no signs of an overdose. Since he was not suffering from an extreme physical illness or possible death, although he was quite high, he was not exhibiting signs of a drug overdose that would have immunized him from prosecution under Florida Statute 893.21(2). 

893.21(2), Florida Statutes (2013):


(2) A person who experiences a drug-related overdose and is in need of medical assistance may not be charged, prosecuted, or penalized pursuant to this chapter for possession of a controlled substance if the evidence for possession of a controlled substance was obtained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical assistance. 


Source: State v Silliman, 5D 14 -2895 (June 12th 2015 Fifth District Court Florida).

Full Opinion is Here:

http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2015/060815/5D14-2895.op.pdf

Marijuana Growers in Florida - The First Fab Five

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Cannabis, Cultivation of Marijuana, Florida Marijuana Laws, Marijuana, Medical Marijuana
Marijuana Growers in Florida - The First Fab Five
First Fab Five Chosen
Florida marijuana growers took a big step - The State of Florida has announced the first five legal growers. They are established to cover five regions in the state. The closest growhouse to Tampa will be Knox Nursery in lovely Winter Garden where they have an  "[e]xpansive selection of flowers, vegetables, shrubbery & home landscaping essentials."

 Miami got a double-dose, when Costa Farms, a "sprawling family-owned nursery . . . of indoor [and] garden tropical plants." in Miami and Alpha Foliage in Homestead were chosen. These five may have an advantage, if the ballot measure to legalize weed passes the ballot. Here they are with a map: 

The Fabulous Five

  1. Alpha Foliage
  2. Chestnut Hill Nursery
  3. Costa Farms
  4. Hackney Nursery Co Inc
  5. Knox Nursery Inc






Alpha Foliage
Address: 27600 SW 217th Ave, Homestead, FL 33031
Phone:(305) 245-2220

Chestnut Hill Nursery
Address: 15105 NW 94th Ave, Alachua, FL 32615
Phone:(386) 462-2820

Costa Farms
Address: 21800 SW 162nd Ave, Miami, FL 33170
Phone:(800) 327-7074

Hackney Nursery Co Inc
Address: 3690 Juniper Creek Rd, Quincy, FL 32351
Phone:(850) 442-6115

Knox Nursery Inc
Address: 940 Avalon Rd, Winter Garden, FL 34787
Phone:(407) 654-1972



Is Cannabis Legal for Terminally Ill Patients in Florida?

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Cannabis Legalized for Terminally
Ill Patients in Florida

Marijuana for terminally ill in Florida?


Currently cannabis is illegal in Florida, except for extremely limited circumstances. There is a bill pending in Florida that will allow cannabis to be an "investigational drug" for use by terminally ill patients. The bill provides, "eligible patients or their legal representatives to purchase and possess cannabis for medical use" and authorizes licensed dispensing organizations "to manufacture, possess, sell, deliver, distribute, dispense, and dispose of cannabis . . . "

Is Cannabis Legal for Terminally Ill Patients in Florida? No, not yet.

Tampa Marijuana Attorney - Motion To Suppress

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A defendant was approached at his residence by two uniformed officers in marked police cruisers and told that the cops needed to talk to defendant about suspicious activity involving drug dealing. Appeals court ruled that the defendant's actions in answering questions and producing bag of marijuana for officers were not voluntary. The Court found that acquiescence to show of authority was grounds to grant motion to suppress. Source: FLW Supp February 14, 2008.

Tampa Marijuana Attorney 

Complete Marijuana Search Opinion of the Court is found here.


Here is a series of Questions and Answers based upon the Court's Ruling


How do Drug Enforcement Officers approach a house without a Search Warrant?


"The police received information that drug dealing might be taking place at a particular address and two uniformed officers went with their marked cruisers to investigate one Sunday morning at approximately 9:00 A.M. They knocked on the door and the defendant opened it, came outside, and closed the door behind him. One officer introduced himself and told the defendant they were there to talk about suspicious activity involving drug dealing."

"During the conversation, which lasted about ten minutes according to the officer and about 30-45 minutes according to the defendant, the officer asked the defendant why someone would say he had suspicious activity at his house. The officer also asked the defendant if he used illegal drugs, the defendant said yes. The officer asked if the defendant used marijuana, the defendant replied yes. He said he bought it a week ago. The officer asked the defendant if he had any marijuana he could give him, the defendant said that he did."

What are some issues that could lead to Dismissal of Drug Charges?


Police coerced the suspect into surrendering marijuana. In support of this claim use Kutzorik v. State, 891 So.2d 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (seizure near home - evidence suppressed) and Miller v. State, 865 So.2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (officers stopped the defendant and her companion as she was about to leave her home - evidence was suppressed).

What factors do courts consider in suppressing illegally seized drugs?

  • Uniformed Officers
  • Marked Patrol car
  • Compliance is Required

"[A}mong the factors it had to consider in its analysis were the place and time of the encounter, the number of officers, and the words and actions of the officer. No one factor is dispositive, but the court noted it was to consider the totality of circumstances of the encounter."


What are the results of a successful challenge to an Illegal Search or seizure?


The judgment and sentence can be reversed, and this case sent back to the trial court judge, and the case will be dismissed.

Drug Sniffing Dog Accuracy Update

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drug dog, drug dog training, drug dog facts, how to fool a drug dog, anti drug dog, how to train a drug dog, drug sniffing dog, drug sniffing dog training, drug dog accuracy, police drug dog, drug detection dog, supreme court drug dog
Drug Sniffing Dog Accuracy

Guy gets 20 years when drug dog
who graduated at the bottom of his class
finds a stash

How accurate must a drug sniffing dog be?


Courts have frequently addressed drug dogs and drug dog training to evaluate whether the indication of drugs during a walk-around is sufficient to justify a complete search. One court ruled that even  though 46 percent of the time, the dog was wrong, that poses no problem to the nearly half of citizens detained and searched with no drugs found.

Cops use dogs to detect many things other than drugs. Sniffing dogs can also detect bombs, blood, and bodies. Drugs are the most profitable use of these furry friends, since forfeiture of vehicles and cash can follow a drug seizure. Dogs can be trained to detect methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy.  The dog sniff can provide probable cause to search a vehicle, property, a home or arrest a person. Some Judges have expressed concern, but convictions are supported even where, "overall accuracy rate in the field (i.e., the number of times he alerts and his human handler finds drugs) is not much better than a coin flip (59.5%)." US v Bentley, No. 10-10108-001 (7th Cir 2015). 




How do they grade a drug dog, drug sniffing dogs, in drug sniffing dog training, and drug dog accuracy, at the Canine Training Institute?

Drug dog success rates in training and on the streets are available. Most agencies maintain training logs and search logs reflecting the accuracy of anti drug dogs. The dog does not need to graduate at the top of the class to hit the streets of America. Even where a dog trained by the Canine Training Institute (CTI) is merely a "lucky dog" with a less than perfect accuracy rate, police continue to use the animals. Dog trainers at CTI  do not calculate class rank and a dog in Illinois, who would have been at the bottom of his class (if the Institute had rated performance) has been supported by both law enforcement officers, prosecutors, trial courts, and federal appeals courts. Police drug dogs continue to be the subject of both state and federal court review.  The training and testing consists of "simulated vehicle searches. . . . . [With rewards] every time the dog alerts in the field. Presumably the dog knows he will get a “giftee” (a rubber hose stuffed with a sock) every time he alerts."


How does the United States Supreme Court rule on Drug detection dogs?


The United States Supreme Court’s decision is Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013). That case overruled Florida's checklist for reviewing canine search accuracy claims by defendants. A summary of the Harris case in the Florida Supreme Court is here: http://www.drug2go.com/2012/03/drug-defense-attorney-drug-dog-sniffs.html . 

In that case, the Florida Supreme Court noted, "a drug-detection dog has been trained and certified to detect narcotics, standing alone, is not sufficient to demonstrate the reliability of the dog. To demonstrate that an officer has a reasonable basis for believing that an alert by a drug-detection dog is sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to search, the State must present evidence of the dog's training and certification records, an explanation of the meaning of the particular training and certification, field performance records (including any unverified alerts), and evidence concerning the experience and training of the officer handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence known to the officer about the dog's reliability."


The standard appears to be, "evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert." Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057

What happened to a Florida Drug Sniffing Dog Search in the United States Supreme Court drug dog Case?


The United States Supreme Court overruled Florida and found that, "Such inaccuracies do not taint records of a dog’s performance in standard training and certification settings, making that performance a better measure of a dog’s reliability. Field records may sometimes be relevant, but the court should evaluate all the evidence and should not prescribe an inflexible set of requirements. " In the Florida case the dog had been trained to detect "methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy).

Here is the Ruling in the US Supreme Court on Drug Sniffing Dogs: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-817_5if6.pdf

How to Beat a Drug Dog Search?

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How to Beat a Drug Dog Search?

What Does the Supreme Court say about Threats of a Drug Dog Search? 


Traffic cops and sometimes other law enforcement try to scare citizens by threatening to call in a dog, if they do not consent to a search. Sometimes a defense to drug crimes and seizures of property can be based upon continued detention by police, who are waiting for the drug dog to show up. "Absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against  unreasonable seizures." Rodriguez v US , 575 U. S. ____ (2015).

What happens when the Cop Threatens to Call a Drug Dog Handler?


Here is a typical pattern used by the police. The traffic cop will ask for permission for the drug dog to sniff around the vehicle. If the driver says "no" the cop may order the driver to "turn off the ignition, exit the vehicle, and stand in front of the patrol car to wait for the second officer." This is exactly what happened in the Rodriguez case. Rodriguez v US , 575 U. S. ____ (2015).

Even though there was only a seven or eight minute delay, the Court found "The question whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation" had not been addressed. So the rule now requires, if the police are to detain a driver after the purpose of the traffic stop has been completed, there must be "reasonable suspicion to continue [the driver’s] detention after issuing the written warning."

Once the traffic stop procedures are completed, courts should not allow "for a traffic stop 'prolonged beyond' the time in fact needed for the officer to complete his traffic-based inquiries . . . . The critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether conducting the sniff adds time to the stop."Rodriguez v US , 575 U. S. ____ (2015).


How to Beat a Drug Dog Search?


  • Obey traffic laws
  • Don't give police founded suspicion
  • Do not consent to a search
  • Force them to call out the dog
  • Do not waive a challenge of the extended detention

Get a Search Warrant for Grow Room says Florida Supreme Court

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Grow House, Growhouse, Warrant, search warrant
Get a Search
Warrant for
Grow
Room

The Florida Supreme Court just decided a case where a bail bondsman entered a home, then searched behind a locked door. Inside the room, which we will call a "grow room", they found a growing operation. The one-room operation was cultivating - call it: cannabis, hemp, sinsemilla; pot, dope, grass, weed, Mary Jane, bud, bhang, kef, ganja, locoweed, reefer, doob, or spliff. The not-so-friendly bail bondsman backed off and then called the cops. The cops arrived and allegedly got consent to search. The appeals court initially ruled that the consent was coerced by the show of force from the police. 



"application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was improper 
and hold that the trial court should have 
suppressed the evidence obtained from the illegal search."

However, that court erroneously ruled that it was inevitable that the police would discover the grow room. The distinction in the case was that the police made no effort to get a search warrant. Therefore, the discovery of the grow room was not inevitable. The case was thrown out. The complete text of the opinion can be found at this link. We have included the most important excerpts from the case below.


"The state did not establish that the police officer or 
any detective had made any efforts to obtain a search warrant"



Q & A | Excerpts from the Court Opinion


What Happens when a Bail Bondsman Opened a Grow Room Door and then Called the Cops?


The facts of this case were presented below: Several bail bondsmen were attempting to locate one of their clients. The client, who had been charged with marijuana cultivation in a different house, had listed the address of Mr. Rodriguez’s home on his application for the bond. When the bondsmen knocked on the front door of that home, Mr. Rodriguez answered. He told the bondsmen that he did not know their client and that he was alone in the home. The bondsmen requested permission to search the home to be certain their client was not hiding there, and Mr. Rodriguez consented.


Is the  Odor of Cannabis a Lawful Basis to search a Home?


The bondsmen noticed a smell of marijuana in the home. Encountering a locked bedroom door, the bondsmen asked Mr. Rodriguez to open it so they could confirm that their client was not hiding there. Mr. Rodriguez unlocked the door and told the bondsmen that he was growing marijuana in the room. At that point, one of the bondsmen in the group moved outside and called the police to report what the bondsmen had observed. 



whether you call it: cannabis, hemp, sinsemilla, pot, dope, 
grass, weed, Mary Jane, bud, bhang, kef, 
ganja, locoweed, reefer, doob, or spliff.


About thirty minutes later, a uniformed officer arrived at the home. The officer testified that Mr. Rodriguez invited him to enter. The officer saw the grow room, called the narcotics squad, and placed Mr. Rodriguez in handcuffs in the back of the officer’s squad car while they waited for the narcotics detectives to arrive. The bondsmen remained at that location throughout, and spoke to the lead detective when the narcotics unit arrived. 


What is Consent to Search under Florida Law?


The lead detective testified that Mr. Rodriguez signed a form consenting to a search of the home. Mr. Rodriguez testified that he only signed the consent forms because the narcotics detectives had guns and most were also wearing masks. After their search confirmed the presence of a “grow room” containing six-foot marijuana plants, lights, and 36 pounds of marijuana, the detectives arrested Mr. Rodriguez. 


The defense filed a motion to suppress. At the hearing on that motion, the circuit court heard testimony from the lead bondsman, the police officer who first responded to the call from the bondsmen, the lead narcotics unit detective, and Mr. Rodriguez. The state did not establish that the police officer or any detective had made any efforts to obtain a search warrant before law enforcement entered the home or Mr. Rodriguez was arrested. The lead detective did, however, testify that he would have sought a warrant if Mr. Rodriguez had not consented to the search. 

What Happens When Consent to Search is Coerced?



The court denied the motion to suppress, although the court found that Mr. Rodriguez’s consent to entry by the police and detectives, and his signature on the consent form, were coerced. The court concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied because probable cause had been established before law enforcement requested consent, and: Soon as the bail bondsman calls and says, Listen I’m looking at a hydroponics lab to me that’s a trigger. If they had not gotten consent they would have gone and gotten a warrant. 


Following the denial of the motion to suppress, Mr. Rodriguez entered a guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal the suppression issue. He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced, and [then appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal].


Get a Search Warrant 

for Grow House in Florida


From the totality of the evidence, we find that the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was improper and hold that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence obtained from the illegal search.


What is the Inevitable Discovery Rule?


Thus, the rule first requires a “reasonable probability” that the evidence would have been discovered despite the improper police procedure. United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980). Second, the State cannot argue that some later or future investigation would have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence; rather, the investigation must be ongoing and the State must show that the facts known by the police at the moment of the unconstitutional procedure would have led to the evidence notwithstanding the police misconduct. See Fitzpatrick, 900 So. 2d at 514; Moody, 842 So. 2d at 759.


The question before this Court is whether the inevitable discovery rule requires the prosecution to demonstrate that the police were in the process of obtaining a warrant prior to the misconduct or whether the prosecution need only establish that a warrant could have been obtained with the information available prior to the misconduct. We conclude that permitting warrantless searches without - 14 - the prosecution demonstrating that the police were in pursuit of a warrant is not a proper application of the inevitable discovery rule. The rule cannot function to apply simply when police could have obtained a search warrant if they had taken the opportunity to pursue one, but can only apply if they actually were in pursuit of one. Within the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule there is no room for probable cause to obviate the requirement to pursue a search warrant, for this would eliminate the role of the magistrate and replace judicial reasoning with the current sense impression of police officers.


Is a Search Warrant Required for a room in a House?


Further, this case involves the sanctity of the home—a bedrock of the Fourth Amendment and an area where a person should enjoy the highest reasonable expectation of privacy. The constitutional guarantee to freedom from warrantless searches is not an inconvenience to be dismissed in favor of claims for police and prosecutorial efficiency. While it is true that here the police were already in possession of the information leading to the evidence before the misconduct, they failed to pursue a legal means to attain this evidence. The police attempted to gain consent from Rodriguez to enter his home, but his consent was found to be coerced and invalid. With no valid consent, and no pursuit of a search warrant, there are no legal means present that would have led to the evidence. In this way, the discovery was not inevitable notwithstanding the police misconduct, and the rule cannot be applied.

What is the Exclusionary Rule?



Because the exclusionary rule works to deter police misconduct by ensuring that the prosecution is not in a better position as a result of the misconduct, the rule cannot be expanded to allow application where there is only probable cause and no pursuit of a warrant. If the prosecution were allowed to benefit in this way, police misconduct would be encouraged instead of deterred, and the rationale behind the exclusionary rule would be eviscerated. Where the prosecution has made no showing that a search warrant was being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct, application of the inevitable discovery rule would effectively nullify the requirement of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. In sum, prosecutors may not be permitted to benefit from the violation of constitutional rights. We cannot apply the inevitable discovery rule in every case where the police had probable cause to obtain a warrant but simply failed to get one. Accordingly, the officers’ failure to seek a search warrant precludes the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine in this case.

Source: http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2015/sc14-160.pdf



Medical Marijuana on Florida Ballot in 2016 Says the Supreme Court

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Medical Marijuana, Florida Medical marijuana, #cannabiscommunity,
Medical Marijuana on
Florida Ballot in 2016
Says the Supreme Court
The Florida Supreme Court has given the go-ahead for the Medical Marijuana issue to be placed on the ballot in 2016. The opinion concluded:


"We therefore approve the 
proposed amendment and 
Financial Impact Statement 
for placement on the ballot."


Who will be eligible for Medical Marijuana?


Those who have a  "“Debilitating Medical Condition” [that] means cancer, epilepsy, glaucoma, positive status for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), Crohn’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, or other debilitating conditions of the same kind or class as or comparable to those enumerated, and for which a physician believes that the medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh the potential health risks for a patient." #CannabisCommunity 

Complete Court Opinion on Florida Medical Marijuana 


The Attorney General of Florida has requested this Court’s opinion as to the validity of an initiative petition submitted by an organization called People United for Medical Marijuana circulated pursuant to article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution, and the corresponding Financial Impact Statement. We have jurisdiction. See art. IV, § 10, art. V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the proposed amendment embraces a single subject and therefore complies with article XI, section 3. We also conclude that the ballot title

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and summary comply with section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2015). Finally, we conclude that the accompanying Financial Impact Statement is in compliance with section 100.371(5), Florida Statutes (2015). We therefore approve the proposed amendment and Financial Impact Statement for placement on the ballot. 

BACKGROUND 

On October 20, 2015, the Attorney General of Florida petitioned this Court for an opinion as to the validity of an initiative petition sponsored by People United for Medical Marijuana and circulated pursuant to article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. The sponsor submitted a brief supporting the validity of the initiative petition. The proposed amendment would create a new section 29 to article X of the Florida Constitution, and states: ARTICLE X, SECTION 29. Medical marijuana production, possession and use. — (a) PUBLIC POLICY. (1) The medical use of marijuana by a qualifying patient or caregiver in compliance with this section is not subject to criminal or civil liability or sanctions under Florida law. (2) A physician shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability or sanctions under Florida law solely for issuing a physician certification with reasonable care to a person diagnosed with a debilitating medical condition in compliance with this section. (3) Actions and conduct by a Medical Marijuana Treatment Center registered with the Department, or its agents or employees, and in compliance with this section and Department regulations, shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability or sanctions under Florida law.

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(b) DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this section, the following words and terms shall have the following meanings: (1) “Debilitating Medical Condition” means cancer, epilepsy, glaucoma, positive status for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), Crohn’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, or other debilitating conditions of the same kind or class as or comparable to those enumerated, and for which a physician believes that the medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh the potential health risks for a patient. (2) “Department” means the Department of Health or its successor agency. (3) “Identification card” means a document issued by the Department that identifies a qualifying patient or a caregiver. (4) “Marijuana” has the meaning given cannabis in Section 893.02(3), Florida Statutes (2014), and, in addition, “Low-THC cannabis” as defined in Section 381.986(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), shall also be included in the meaning of the term “marijuana.” (5) “Medical Marijuana Treatment Center” (MMTC) means an entity that acquires, cultivates, possesses, processes (including development of related products such as food, tinctures, aerosols, oils, or ointments), transfers, transports, sells, distributes, dispenses, or administers marijuana, products containing marijuana, related supplies, or educational materials to qualifying patients or their caregivers and is registered by the Department. (6) “Medical use” means the acquisition, possession, use, delivery, transfer, or administration of an amount of marijuana not in conflict with Department rules, or of related supplies by a qualifying patient or caregiver for use by the caregiver’s qualifying patient for the treatment of a debilitating medical condition. (7) “Caregiver” means a person who is at least twenty-one (21) years old who has agreed to assist with a qualifying patient’s medical use of marijuana and has qualified for and obtained a caregiver identification card issued by the Department. The Department may limit the number of qualifying patients a caregiver may assist at one time and the number of caregivers that a qualifying patient may have at one time. Caregivers are prohibited from consuming marijuana obtained for medical use by the qualifying patient.

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(8) “Physician” means a person who is licensed to practice medicine in Florida. (9) “Physician certification” means a written document signed by a physician, stating that in the physician’s professional opinion, the patient suffers from a debilitating medical condition, that the medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh the potential health risks for the patient, and for how long the physician recommends the medical use of marijuana for the patient. A physician certification may only be provided after the physician has conducted a physical examination and a full assessment of the medical history of the patient. In order for a physician certification to be issued to a minor, a parent or legal guardian of the minor must consent in writing. (10) “Qualifying patient” means a person who has been diagnosed to have a debilitating medical condition, who has a physician certification and a valid qualifying patient identification card. If the Department does not begin issuing identification cards within nine (9) months after the effective date of this section, then a valid physician certification will serve as a patient identification card in order to allow a person to become a “qualifying patient” until the Department begins issuing identification cards. (c) LIMITATIONS. (1) Nothing in this section allows for a violation of any law other than for conduct in compliance with the provisions of this section. (2) Nothing in this section shall affect or repeal laws relating to non-medical use, possession, production, or sale or marijuana. (3) Nothing in this section authorizes the use of medical marijuana by anyone other than a qualifying patient. (4) Nothing in this section shall permit the operation of any vehicle, aircraft, train or boat while under the influence of marijuana. (5) Nothing in this section requires the violation of federal law or purports to give immunity under federal law. (6) Nothing in this section shall require any accommodation of any on-site medical use of marijuana in any correctional institution or detention facility or place of education or employment, or of smoking medical marijuana in any public place. (7) Nothing in this section shall require any health insurance provider or any government agency or authority to reimburse any person for expenses related to the medical use of marijuana.

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(8) Nothing in this section shall affect or repeal laws relating to negligence or professional malpractice on the part of a qualified patient, caregiver, physician, MMTC, or its agents or employees. (d) DUTIES OF THE DEPARTMENT. The Department shall issue reasonable regulations necessary for the implementation and enforcement of this section. The purpose of the regulations is to ensure the availability and safe use of medical marijuana by qualifying patients. It is the duty of the Department to promulgate regulations in a timely fashion. (1) Implementing Regulations. In order to allow the Department sufficient time after passage of this section, the following regulations shall be promulgated no later than six (6) months after the effective date of this section: a. Procedures for the issuance and annual renewal of qualifying patient identification cards to people with physician certifications and standards for renewal of such identification cards. Before issuing an identification card to a minor, the Department must receive written consent from the minor’s parent or legal guardian, in addition to the physician certification. b. Procedures establishing qualifications and standards for caregivers, including conducting appropriate background checks, and procedures for the issuance and annual renewal of caregiver identification cards. c. Procedures for the registration of MMTCs that include procedures for the issuance, renewal, suspension and revocation of registration, and standards to ensure proper security, record keeping, testing, labeling, inspection, and safety. d. A regulation that defines the amount of marijuana that could reasonably be presumed to be an adequate supply for qualifying patients’ medical use, based on the best available evidence. This presumption as to quantity may be overcome with evidence of a particular qualifying patient’s appropriate medical use. (2) Identification cards and registrations. The Department shall begin issuing qualifying patient and caregiver identification cards, and registering MMTCs no later than nine (9) months after the effective date of this section. (3) If the Department does not issue regulations, or if the Department does not begin issuing identification cards and registering MMTCs within the time limits set in this section, any Florida citizen

- 6 -

shall have standing to seek judicial relief to compel compliance with the Department’s constitutional duties. (4) The Department shall protect the confidentiality of all qualifying patients. All records containing the identity of qualifying patients shall be confidential and kept from public disclosure other than for valid medical or law enforcement purposes. (e) LEGISLATION. Nothing in this section shall limit the legislature from enacting laws consistent with this section. (f) SEVERABILITY. The provisions of this section are severable and if any clause, sentence, paragraph or section of this measure, or an application thereof, is adjudged invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction other provisions shall continue to be in effect to the fullest extent possible. The ballot title for the amendment is: “Use of Marijuana for Debilitating Medical Conditions.” The ballot summary states: Allows medical use of marijuana for individuals with debilitating medical conditions as determined by a licensed Florida physician. Allows caregivers to assist patients’ medical use of marijuana. The Department of Health shall register and regulate centers that produce and distribute marijuana for medical purposes and shall issue identification cards to patients and caregivers. Applies only to Florida law. Does not immunize violations of federal law or any non-medical use, possession or production of marijuana. On October 21, 2015, the Financial Impact Estimating Conference forwarded to the Attorney General the following financial impact statement regarding the initiative petition: Increased costs from this amendment to state and local governments cannot be determined. There will be additional regulatory costs and enforcement activities associated with the production, sale, use and possession of medical marijuana. Fees may offset some of the regulatory costs. Sales tax will likely apply to most purchases, resulting in a substantial increase in state and local government

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revenues that cannot be determined precisely. The impact on property tax revenues cannot be determined. No briefs or comments were submitted to this Court in support of or in opposition to the financial impact statement. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court has traditionally applied a deferential standard of review to the validity of a citizen initiative petition and “has been reluctant to interfere” with “the right of self-determination for all Florida’s citizens” to formulate “their own organic law.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. 2002). In re Advisory Opinion to Atty. Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So. 3d 786, 794 (Fla. 2014). As such, we have explained that we are obliged to uphold a proposed amendment unless it is “clearly and conclusively defective.” In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Florida’s Amend. to Reduce Class Size, 816 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 2002). When this Court renders an advisory opinion concerning a proposed constitutional amendment arising through the citizen initiative process, the Court limits its inquiry to two issues: (1) whether the amendment itself satisfies the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution; and (2) whether the ballot title and summary satisfy the clarity requirements of section 101.161, Florida Statutes. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Water & Land Conservation—Dedicates Funds to Acquire & Restore Fla. Conservation & Recreation Lands, 123 So. 3d 47, 50 (Fla. 2013).

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SINGLE-SUBJECT REQUIREMENT Article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution provides that any proposed citizen initiative amendment “shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.” Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const. “In evaluating whether a proposed amendment violates the single-subject requirement, the Court must determine whether it has a ‘logical and natural oneness of purpose.’ ” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Amend. to Bar Gov’t from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 891-92 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 990 (Fla. 1984)). This single-subject rule prevents a proposal “from engaging in either of two practices: (a) logrolling; or (b) substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple branches of state government.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Water & Conservation, 123 So. 3d at 50. This Court has defined logrolling as “a practice wherein several separate issues are rolled into a single initiative in order to aggregate votes or secure approval of an otherwise unpopular issue.” In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1994). And, this Court has explained that “[a] proposal that affects several branches of government will not automatically fail; rather it is when a proposal substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple branches that it violates

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the single-subject test.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fish and Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So. 2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fla. 1998). We conclude that the initiative has a logical and natural oneness of purpose, specifically, whether Floridians wish to include a provision in our state constitution permitting the medical use of marijuana. The proposed amendment’s provision regarding the specific role for the Department of Health in overseeing and licensing the medical use of marijuana is directly connected with this purpose. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fee on Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So. 2d 1124, 1128 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that the proposal did not violate the single-subject rule and explaining that “the imposition of the fee and the designation of the revenue . . . are two components directly connected to the fundamental policy of requiring first processors to contribute towards ongoing Everglades restoration”). Further, the proposed amendment’s provision removing state-imposed penalties and liability from those involved in the authorized use of medical marijuana is also directly connected with the amendment’s purpose. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not engage in impermissible logrolling. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Transp. Initiative for Statewide High Speed Monorail, Fixed Guideway or Magnetic Levitation Sys., 769 So. 2d 367, 369 (Fla. 2000) (holding that “there is no impermissible logrolling” where “[t]he only subject embraced in the proposed amendment is whether the people of this State want to include a

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provision in their Constitution mandating that the government build a high speed ground transportation system”). Additionally, the proposed amendment does not substantially alter or perform the functions of multiple branches. If the proposed amendment passes, the Department of Health would perform regulatory oversight, which would not substantially alter its function or have a substantial impact on legislative functions or powers. The proposed amendment would require the Department of Health (or its successor agency) to register and oversee providers, issue identification cards, and determine treatment amounts. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Fee on Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So. 2d at 1128 (“[T]he Fee amendment does not substantially affect or alter any government function, but is a levy by an existing agency.”); see also Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Term Limits Pledge, 718 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1998) (finding that the initiative did not substantially alter the functions of multiple branches “even though affecting the constitutional authority of the Secretary of State and affecting more than one provision of the constitution”). “[T]he fact that [a] branch of government is required to comply with a provision of the Florida Constitution does not necessarily constitute the usurpation of the branch’s function within the meaning of the single subject rule.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Protect People, Especially Youth, From Addiction, Disease, & Other Health Hazards of Using Tobacco, 926 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla.

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2006). Moreover, the Department of Health would not be empowered under this proposed amendment to make the types of primary policy decisions that are prohibited under the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978). Accordingly, we conclude that the amendment complies with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3. BALLOT TITLE AND SUMMARY We next address whether the proposed amendment will be “accurately represented on the ballot.” Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 12 (Fla. 2000) (emphasis omitted). We conclude that the ballot title and summary meet the statutory requirements and accurately represent the proposed amendment on the ballot. Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2015) provides the following clarity requirements for the ballot title and summary: The ballot summary of the amendment or other public measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure. . . . The ballot title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of. The purpose of these requirements is “to provide fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment so that the voter will not be misled as to its purpose, and can

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cast an intelligent and informed ballot.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Term Limits Pledge, 718 So. 2d 798, 803 (Fla. 1998). This Court’s review of the validity of a ballot title and summary under section 101.161(1) involves two inquiries: First, the Court asks whether “the ballot title and summary . . . fairly inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment.” Right to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d [491, 497 (Fla. 2002)]. Second, the Court asks “whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1998). Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fairness Initiative Requiring Leg. Determination That Sales Tax Exemptions & Exclusions Serve a Public Purpose, 880 So. 2d 630, 635-36 (Fla. 2004). We conclude that the ballot title and summary comply with the statutory word limitations. Additionally, the ballot title and summary fairly inform voters of the purpose of the proposed amendment—the state authorization of medical marijuana for patients with debilitating medical conditions. The language is clear and does not mislead voters regarding the actual content of the proposed amendment. Accordingly, we conclude that the ballot title and summary comply with the clarity requirements of section 101.161.

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FINANCIAL IMPACT STATEMENTS We have an independent obligation to review the financial impact statement to ensure that it is clear and unambiguous and in compliance with Florida law. See Adv. Op. to Atty Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Certain Medical Conditions, 132 So. 3d at 809 (citing Adv. Op. to Atty Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption & Amend. of Local Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 963 So. 2d 210, 214 (Fla. 2007)). Article XI, section 5(c), of the Florida Constitution provides, “The legislature shall provide by general law, prior to the holding of an election pursuant to this section, for the provision of a statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact of any amendment proposed by initiative pursuant to section 3.” Additionally, section 100.371(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), provides that the financial impact statement must address “the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state or local governments resulting from the proposed initiative.” Section 100.371(5)(c)2, Florida Statutes (2015), requires the financial impact statement to be “clear and unambiguous” and “no more than 75 words in length.” We have explained that our “review of financial impact statements is narrow.” Adv. Op. to Att’y Gen. re Water & Land Conservation, 123 So. 3d at 52. We address only “whether the statement is clear, unambiguous, consists of no more than seventy-five words, and is limited to address the estimated increase or

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decrease in any revenues or costs to the state or local governments.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Local Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 963 So. 2d at 214. We determine that the financial impact statement complies with the word limit and meets the other statutory requirements. It clearly and unambiguously states that there are likely increased costs associated with the additional regulatory and enforcement activities that the proposal would require, but that the amount could not be determined and fees may offset a portion of the increased costs. Additionally, the financial impact statement clearly and unambiguously explains that the Financial Estimating Conference could not determine the change in revenue. Accordingly, we hold that the financial impact statement complies with section 100.371(5), Florida Statutes (2015). See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Growth Mgmt. Initiative Giving Citizens the Right to Decide Local Growth Mgmt. Plan Changes, 2 So. 3d 118, 124 (Fla. 2008) (“Overall, the financial impact statement is necessarily indefinite but not unclear or ambiguous.”). CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the initiative petition and ballot title and summary satisfy the legal requirements of article XI, section 3, of the Florida Constitution, and section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes. In addition, the Financial Impact Statement is in compliance with section 100.371(5), Florida

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Statutes. We therefore approve the proposed amendment and Financial Impact Statement for placement on the ballot. It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Two Cases: Original Proceeding – Advisory Opinion – Attorney General Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Ellen B. Gwynn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner Jon L. Mills of Boies Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Miami, Florida; Timothy Edd McLendon, Gainesville, Florida; and Andrew Mifflin Starling, Orlando, Florida, for People United for Medical Marijuana, Sponsor

Source: http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2015/sc15-1796.pdf

Medical Marijuana Legal Advice - Can a lawyer advise a client about using the drug or operating such a business without running afoul of the Bar?

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Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, medical marijuana dispensary, Medical Marijuana, Medical Marijuana Card, medical marijuana cooperative, medical marijuana lawyer
Legal Advice for
Medical Marijuana
Dispensaries
With a possible legalization of medical marijuana on deck in Florida, many are wondering how can a lawyer advise using the drug or operating a marijuana dispensary without running afoul of the Bar? Now we know the Florida Bar's position. "Yes [counsel can advise], according to the Bar Board of Governors, which adopted a policy not to prosecute Bar members for misconduct if they advise clients about the new state law — as long as they also remind clients about federal law. " says the Florida Bar News in its June 15, 2014 edition.

Can a lawyer advise a client about Medical Marijuana without Violating Bar Rules?


The new medical marijuana Policy follows: “The Florida Bar will not prosecute a Florida Bar member solely for advising a client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning of Florida statutes regarding medical marijuana or for assisting a client in conduct the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by Florida statutes, regulations, orders, and other state or local provisions implementing them, as long as the lawyer also advises the client regarding related federal law and policy.

How were Medical Marijuana Nurseries Chosen in Florida? Medical Marijuana on Trial in Hillsborough County Florida

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cannabis, dispensing facility, Dispensing Organization
A Hillsborough County business has
challenged the issuance of
medical marijuana
nursery licenses in Florida. 
A Hillsborough County business has challenged the issuance of medical marijuana nursery licenses in Florida. Plants of Ruskin claims it "provided sufficient information in its Application demonstrating entitlement to the requested license pursuant to Chapter 64, FAC.” The grower claims  “arbitrary scoring of  applications” was the cause of its demise. The grower claims that if the scoring had been fair, they would have been scored higher than the other nurseries.

How were Medical Marijuana Nurseries Chosen in Florida?


The selection was based upon a lengthy scorecard that rated and scored each applicant. The areas included expertise in growing and dispensing. There were numerous points given for the security of the growing facility. Sections of the "Scorecard for Low-THC Cannabis Dispensing Organization" also covered medical personnel including a doctor and his/her qualifications. 

The process evaluated Vehicles that will be used to transport product among cultivating, processing, and dispensing facilities; Locking options; Alarm systems; Video surveillance; Systems for tracking THC plant material throughout dispensing; and Inventory control systems for THC cannabis and Derivative Products.

Key Points in Medical Marijuana Licensing Lawsuit


  • 5 Growers outside their regions are able to dispense cannabis throughout the state, including the region containing Hillsborough County.
  • 5 Growers have an unfair advantage by being allowed to begin dispensing cannabis statewide or regionally during the litigation.
  • 5 Growers will have a "monopoly" by being allowed to begin dispensing cannabis statewide or regionally during the litigation.
  • The Department of Health Office of Compassionate Use improperly scored the winning applications.
  • Scorecard for Low-THC Cannabis Dispensing Organization Selection form was improperly evaluated, approved, and used in the selection process.

Excerpt from Scorecard for Low-THC Cannabis Dispensing Organizations


Dispensing Technical Ability 

1. Experience interacting with patients
2. Experience with handling confidential information
3. A marketing plan
4. Experience gathering and managing data, i.e. data on patient reactions to products dispensed
5. Experience with recalls
6. Knowledge of cannabis routes of administration
7. Training programs for employees addressing:
    a) The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
    b) Patient education
    c) Compliance
    d) Patient counseling
    e) Data collection
8. Any awards, recognition or certifications received for relevant expertise.
Infrastructure
9. A map showing the location of the applicant’s proposed  facilities
10. A sketch or other illustration of the actual or proposed locations showing streets property lines buildings parking areas outdoor areas, if applicable fences security features fire hydrants, if applicable and access to water and sanitation systems
11. A floor plan of the actual or proposed building or buildings where dispensing activities will occur showing:
    a) Areas designed to protect patient privacy
    b) Areas designed for retail sales
12. A HIPAA compliant computer network utilized by all facilities
13. Vehicles that will be used to transport product among cultivating, processing, and dispensing facilities
14. Communication systems
15. Hours of operation of each dispensing facility and
16. Methods of mitigating odors if applicable
Premises, Resources, Personnel
17. Location of all properties Applicant proposes to utilize to dispense low-THC cannabis and Derivative Products, including ownership information for the properties and any lease terms if applicable”
    a) For any property leased by the Applicant, include documentation that property owner consents to the use of the property for the purpose of dispensing of Derivative Products and documentation that the mortgagor or lienholder has been given notice of the use of the property for the purpose of dispensing of Derivative Products
    b) Documentation that the mortgagor or lienholder has been notified of the use of the property for the purposes of dispensing of Derivative Products
18. Compliance with local regulations regarding sanitation and waste disposal
19. The ability to obtain zoning approval
20. Sketch or other illustration approximating the property boundaries, land topography, vegetation, proposed and/or existing structures, easements, wells, and roadways for each property proposed
21. A description of the ability or plan to expand any of the areas proposed for dispensing Derivative Products
22. Description of the methods proposed for the dispensing of Derivative Products, including the following:
    a) Accessibility of dispensing facilities, e.g., centrally located to several populated areas, located on a main roadway, not in a high crime area, et cetera
    b) Proximity of dispensing facilities to patient populations and
    c) Alternative dispensing, e.g. delivery.
23. A list of current and proposed staffing, including:
    a) Position, duties and responsibilities
    b) Resume and
    c) Professional licensure disciplinary action in all jurisdictions
24. An organizational chart illustrating the supervisory structure of the proposed Dispensing Organization
25. Plans and procedures for loss of key personnel
26. Plans and procedures for complying with OSHA regulations for workplace safety
Accountability
27. Floor plan of each facility or proposed floor plans for proposed facilities, including the following:
    a) Locking options for each means of ingress and egress
    b) Alarm systems
    c) Video surveillance
    d) Name and function of each room
    e) Layout and dimensions of each room
28. Storage, including the following:
    a) Safes
    b) Vaults
    c) Climate control
29. Diversion and trafficking prevention procedures
30. A facility emergency management plan
31. System for tracking low-THC source plant material throughout dispensing
32. Inventory control system for low-THC cannabis and Derivative Products
33. Policies and procedures for recordkeeping
34. Vehicle tracking systems
35. Vehicle security systems
36. Methods of screening and monitoring employees
37. Personnel qualifications and experience with chain of custody or other tracking mechanisms
38. Personnel reserved solely for inventory control purposes
39. Personnel reserved solely for security purposes
40. Plans for the recall of any Derivative Products that have a reasonable probability of causing adverse health consequences based on a testing result, bad patient reaction, or other reason
41. Access to specialized resources or expertise regarding data collection, security, and tracking.




Sources: 

http://www.floridahealth.gov/programs-and-services/office-of-compassionate-use/_documents/amended-petition-plants-of-ruskin.pdf
https://www.flrules.org/gateway/reference.asp?No=Ref-05461
https://www.flrules.org/gateway/readRefFile.asp?refId=5461&filename=64-4%20Certification.Scorecard%20Form%20DH8007-OCU-2.2015.docx

250 Ways to Go to Jail for Drug Crimes | Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida

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Drug Crimes, Drug Laws, Florida Drug Crimes List, Tampa Drug crimes, Hillsborough Drug Crimes

Definitive List of Florida Drug Crimes Statutes


There are 250 Ways to Go to Jail for Drug Crimes in Tampa. There are 250 types of Drug Crimes Charged in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. Here is a list of every type of drug crime charged in Hillsborough County. The list includes the Florida Statute number and the computer codes used by law enforcement to classify the charged offenses. These are frequently referred to as charges codes or form codes.

The list includes both felonies and misdemeanors, includes the Florida Statute, and a brief description of the charges.



250 Ways to Go to Jail for Drug Crimes in Tampa, Florida


    Form Code   Statute                Level            Degree         Charge Description

Drug0801
817.563.2
Misd
1st
Sale Of Substance In Lieu Of Controlled Substa
Drug0802
817.563.1
Fel
3rd
Sale Of Substance In Lieu Of Controlled Substa
Drug0803
817.564.3
Fel
3rd
Poss.AndDel. Of Counterfeit Controlled Substa
Fel
3rd
Fel
3rd
Fel
2nd
Drug1201
893.13.1a
Fel
3rd
Solicitation To Deliver Cocaine
Fel
2nd
Drug1301
893.13.1e
Fel
1st
Poss Of Cocaine With Intent To Del Within 1000
Drug1302
893.13.1a1
Fel
1st
Armed Possession Of Cocaine With Intent To Del
Drug1304
893.13.1f1
Fel
1st
Possession Of Cocaine With Intent To Sell Manu
Drug1305
893.13.1i
Fel
1st
Poss Of Cocaine With Intent Within 200 Of Publ
Drug1306
893.13.1c
Fel
1st
Possess Of Cocaine With Intent To Deliver 1000
Drug1309
893.13.F1
Fel
1st
Poss Cocaine With Sell  Manufacture Or Deliver
Drug1310
893.13.1f1
Fel
2nd
Armed Possession Of Cocaine
Drug1311
893.13.1c1
Fel
1st
Possession Of Cocaine Win 1000 Feet Of A Schoo
Drug1311
893.13.1c1
Fel
1st
Possession Of Cocaine With Intent To Deliver W
Drug1313
893.13.1b1
Fel
1st
Poss Of Cocaine With Intent To Sell Manufactur
Drug1315
893.13.1f1
Fel
1st
Possession Of Cocaine With Intent To Sell Manu
Drug1400
893.13.1a
Fel
2nd
Sale Of Cocaine
Drug1600
893.13.1a
Fel
2nd
Purchase Of Cocaine
Drug1604
893.13.1i
Fel
1st
Purchase Cocaine Wthn 200 Feet Public Housing
Drug1606
893.13.2a
Fel
2nd
Purchase Of Cocaine
Drug1607
893.13.2a
Fel
3rd
Solicitation To Purchase Cocaine
Drug1700
893.13.1e
Fel
1st
Delivery Of Cocaine Within 1000 Feet Of School
Drug1703
893.13.1i
Fel
1st
Delivery Of Cocaine Wthn 200 Feet Of Posted
Drug1704
893.13.1i
Fel
1st
Deliver Cocaine Wthn 200 Ft Of Public Housing
Drug1705
893.13.1i
Fel
1st
Deliver Cocaine Wthn 200 Ft Of Public Housing
Drug1706
893.13.1c
Fel
1st
Delivery Of Cocaine Within 1000 Ft Of School
Drug1709
893.13.F1
Fel
1st
Delivery Cocaine Within 200 Ft Of Public Housi
Drug1710
893.13.4a
Fel
1st
Use Of Minor To Deliver Cocaine
Drug1712
893.13.1c1
Fel
1st
Sale Deliver Cocaine Win 1000 Ft Chld Care Fac
Drug1714
893.13.1c1
Fel
1st
Delivery Of Cocaine Within 1000 Feet Of School
Drug1715
893.13.1f1
Fel
1st
Delivery Of Cocaine Wtn 1000 Ft Public Housing
Drug1717
893.13.1c1
Fel
1st
Deliver Cocaine Wthn 1000 Feet Of PublicPark
Drug1718
893.13.1d1
Fel
1st
Deliver Cocaine Win 1000 Ft Of  Post Secondart
Drug1720
893.13.7a1
Misd
1st
Unlawful Dispensing Of A Controlled Substance
Drug1801
893.13.1a1
Fel
3rd
Solicitation To Deliver Controlled Substance
Drug1801
893.13.1a1
Fel
3rd
Solicitation To Deliver Controlled Substance
Drug1802
893.13.1a2
Misd
1st
Solicitation To Deliver Controlled Substance
Drug1803
893.13.2a1
Fel
3rd
Solicitation To Purchase Controlled Substance
Drug1804
893.13.2a2
Misd
1st
Solicitation To Purchase Controlled Substance
Drug1896
893.1351.1
Fel
3rd
Own, Lease Rent To Traffic, Sell, Manufacture
Drug1897
893.1351.3
Fel
1st
Possession For Purpose Of Manufacturing A Cont
Drug1898
893.1351.2
Fel
2nd
Poss W/Purpose To Traffic, Sell Or Manufacture
Fel
1st
Drug1905
893.135.1b1b
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Cocaine   200 To 400 Grams
Drug1906
893.135.1b1c
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Cocaine   400 Grms To 150 Kilo
Drug1908
893.13.1a1
Fel
3rd
Conspiracy To Deliver Controlled Substance
Drug1910
893.13.1a2
Misd
1st
Conspiracy To Deliver Controlled Substance
Drug1914
893.135.1b1a
Fel
Life
Armed Trafficking In Cocaine   28 To 200 Grams
Drug1915
893.135.1b1b
Fel
Life
Armed Trafficking In Cocaine   200 To 400 Grms
Drug1916
893.135.1b1c
Fel
Life
Armed Trafficking In Cocaine   400 Grms To 150
Drug1918
893.13.6a
Fel
3rd
Solicitation To Possess Controlled Substance
Drug2100
893.13.1f
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Cannabis
Fel
3rd
Misd
1st
Drug2104
893.13.6a
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Cannabis Sativa Resin
Drug2110
893.13.1g
Misd
1st
Possession Of Cannabis
Fel
3rd
Drug2201
893.13.1a
Fel
3rd
Solicitation To Deliver Cannabis
Drug2204
893.13.1c
Fel
2nd
Delivery Of Cannabis Within 1000 Feet Of Schoo
Drug2212
893.13.3
Misd
1st
Delivery Of Less Than 20 Grams Of Cannabis
Fel
3rd
Drug2303
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Poss Of Cann With Intent Within 200 Ft Post Ed
Drug2304
893.13.1f2
Fel
2nd
Poss Cannabis With Intent To Sell    Manuf   D
Drug2305
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Poss Of Cannabis With Intent Within 200 Ft Of
Drug2306
893.13.F2
Fel
2nd
Poss Cannabis Wit Sell   Manufacture Or Delive
Drug2309
893.13.1c
Fel
2nd
Poss Cannabis Wit Sell  Manufacture   Del 1000
Drug2311
893.13.1c
Fel
2nd
Possession Of Cannabis With Intent To Sell Man
Drug2313
893.13.1d2
Fel
2nd
Possession Of Cannabis With Intent To Sell Man
Drug2315
893.13.1f2
Fel
2nd
Possession Of Cannabis With Intent To Sell Pur
Drug2400
893.13.1a
Fel
3rd
Sale Of Cannabis
Drug2500
893.13.1a
Fel
3rd
Manufacture Of Cannabis
Drug2601
893.13.2a
Misd
1st
Solicitation To Purchase Cannabis
Drug2604
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Purchase Of Cannabis Within 200 Ft Of Public H
Drug2606
893.13.2a
Fel
3rd
Purchase Of Cannabis
Drug2703
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Del Of Cannabis Within 200 Ft Public Housing F
Drug2705
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Del Of Cannabis Within 200 Ft Of A PublicPark
Drug2710
893.13.F2
Fel
2nd
Deliver Cannabis 200 Ft Public Housing Facilit
Drug2712
893.13.1d2
Fel
2nd
Delivery Of Cannabis Within 1000 Feet Of A Pos
Drug2717
893.13.1c2
Fel
2nd
Delivery Of Cannabis Within 100 Feet Of A Publ
Drug2720
893.13.1f2
Fel
2nd
Deliver Cannabis Win 1000 Feet Public Housi
Drug2902
893.135.1a2
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Cannabis   2000 To 10000 Lbs
Drug2905
893.135.1a1
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Cannabis   25 To 2000 Pounds
Drug2906
893.135.1a1
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Cannabis  30 To 2000 Plants
Drug2910
893.135.1a
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Trafficking In Cannabis
Drug3100
893.13.1f
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Heroin
Fel
3rd
Drug3200
893.13.1a
Fel
2nd
Delivery Of Heroin
Drug3300
893.13.1a
Fel
2nd
Poss Of Heroin With Intent To Sell Or Deliver
Drug3304
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Poss Of Heroin With Intent To Sell Or Deliver
Drug3305
893.13.F1
Fel
1st
Poss Heroin Wit Sell Deliver Wthn 200 Ft Publi
Drug3310
893.13.1f1
Fel
1st
Possession Of Heroin With Intent To Sell And D
Drug3601
893.13.2a1
Fel
2nd
Purchase Of Heroin
Drug3812
893.135.1c
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Illegal Drug  4 To 14
Drug3813
893.135.1c
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Drugs  14 To 28 Grams
Drug3814
893.135.1c
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Illegal Drugs  28 To
Drug3816
893.135.1c
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Illegal Drugs  30 Kil
Drug3819
893.135.1c1a
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Heroin  4 To 24 Grams Clerks Of
Drug3901
893.135.1c1
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Illegal Drugs   4 To 14 Grams
Drug3903
893.135.1c3
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Illegal Drugs  28 Gram Or More
Drug3904
893.135.1c1a
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Illegal Drugs  4 To 14 Grams
Drug3907
893.135.1c2
Fel
Life
Trafficking In Heroin More Than 30 Kilograms
Fel
1st
Drug3913
893.135.1c1b
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Illegal Drugs 14 To 28 Grams
Drug3914
893.135.1c1c
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Illegal Drugs 28 Gram To 30 Kil
Drug3916
893.135.1c2
Fel
1st, Life
Trafficking In Illegal Drugs 30 Kilo Or More
Drug3917
893.135.1c1c
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Heroin
Drug3921
893.135.1c1a
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Heroin
Drug3922
893.135.1c1b
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Heroin 14-28 Grams
Drug3923
893.135.1c1c
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Heroin 28-30 Kilogram
Drug3924
893.135.1c2
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Heroin 30 Kilo Or Mor
Drug3932
893.135.1c1a
Fel
2nd
Attempt To Traffic In Illegal Drugs 4 To 14 Gr
Drug3933
893.135.1c1b
Fel
2nd
Attempt To Traffic In Illegal Drugs 14 To 28 G
Drug3934
893.135.1c1c
Fel
2nd
Attempt To Traffic In Illegal Drugs 28 Grams T
Drug4101
893.13.6a
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Lsd
Drug4705
893.135.1l1a
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Lsd 1 To 5 Grams
Drug4800
893.1351.B1a
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Cocaine 28 - 200 Gram
Drug4801
893.1351.B1b
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Cocaine 200-400 Grams
Drug4802
893.1351.B1c
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Cocaine 400 Grams To
Drug4803
893.135.1b2
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Cocaine 150 Kilograms
Drug4803
893.135.1b2
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Cocaine 150 Kilograms
Drug5901
893.135.1d1
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Phencyclidine   28 To 200 Grams
Drug5902
893.135.1d2
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Phencyclidine   200 To 400 Grms
Drug7815
893.135.1f1a
Fel
Life
Armed Trafficking In Methamphetamine  14 To 28
Drug7901
893.135.1f1a
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Amphetamine   14 To 28 Grams
Drug7901
893.135.1f1a
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Amphetamine   14 To 28 Grams
Drug7901
893.135.1f1a
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Amphetamine   14 To 28 Grams
Drug7902
893.135.1f1b
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Amphetamine   28 To 200 Grams
Drug7902
893.135.1f1b
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Amphetamine   28 To 200 Grams
Drug7903
893.135.1f1c
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Amphetamine 200 Grams Or More
Drug7903
893.135.1f1c
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Amphetamine 200 Grams Or More
Drug8100
893.147.
Misd
1st
Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia
Drug8101
893.13.1a1
Fel
3rd
Solicitation To Deliver Controlled Substance
Drug8110
893.147.2ab
Fel
3rd
Manufacture Or Delivery Of Drug Paraphernalia
Drug8120
893.147.4
Fel
3rd
Unlawful Transportation Of Drug Paraphernalia
Drug9050
877.111.4
Fel
3rd
Unlawful Distribution Of Nitrous Oxide
Drug9055
877.111.2
Misd
2nd
Possession Or Sale Of Harmful Chemical
Drug9098
877.111.
Misd
2nd
Inhalation Or Possession Of Harmful Substance
Drug9100
893.13.1f
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Controlled Substance
Fel
3rd
Drug9102
893.13.6c
Fel
1st
Poss Of Controlled Subst In Excess Of 10 Grams
Drug9103
893.13.1b
Fel
1st
Delivery Controlled Substance In Excess Of 10
Drug9105
893.13.6a
Fel
2nd
Armed Possession Of Controlled Substance





Fel






Drug9300
893.13.1a
Fel

Poss Cont Sub With Intent To Sell Or Deliver





Drug9301
893.13.1a
Fel
2nd
Armed Possession Of Controlled Substance With
Drug9302
893.13.1a
Fel
1st
Armed Possession Of Controlled Substance With
Drug9303
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Poss Of Controlled Substance With Intent To Se
Drug9304
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Poss Of Controlled Substance With Intent Sell
Drug9305
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Poss Of Controlled Substance  With Intent Sell
Drug9306
893.13.F
Fel
2nd
Poss Controlled Subst Wit Sell 200 Ft Public H
Drug9309
893.13.1c1
Fel
1st
Possess Contrld Subst W Intent 1000 Ft Of Park
Drug9310
893.13.1d1
Fel
1st
Possession Of A Controlled Substance With Inte
Drug9311
893.13.1c2
Fel
2nd
Possess Contrld Sub W Intent Wtn 1000 Ft Park
Drug9312
893.13.1d2
Fel
2nd
Poss Of Control Sub With Intent To Sell Manufa
Drug9313
893.13.1a
Fel
1st
Armed Delivery Of A Controlled Substance
Drug9314
893.13.1a
Fel
2nd
Armed Delivery Of Controlled Substance
Drug9500
893.13.1a
Fel

Manufacture Of Controlled Substance
Drug9500
893.13.1a
Fel

Manufacture Of Controlled Substance
Drug9500
893.13.1a
Fel

Manufacture Of Controlled Substance
Drug9606
893.13.2a
Fel
3rd
Purchase Of Controlled Substance
Drug9607
893.13.5a
Fel
2nd
Importation Of Controlled Substance
Drug9608
893.13.5b
Fel
3rd
Importation Of Controlled Substance
Drug9705
893.135.1f1
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Methamphetamine
Drug9705
893.135.1f1
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Methamphetamine
Drug9706
893.135.1f1a
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Amphetamine 14-28 Gr
Drug9707
893.135.1f1b
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Amphetamine 28-200 Gr
Drug9708
893.135.1f1c
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Amphetamine    200 Gr
Drug9712
893.13.1c
Fel

Sale Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of School
Drug9712
893.13.1c
Fel

Sale Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of School
Drug9712
893.13.1c
Fel

Sale Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of School
Drug9713
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Deliver Of Controlled Substance Wtihin 200 Ft
Drug9714
893.13.1i
Fel
2nd
Deliver Of Controlled Substance Within 200 Ft
Drug9716
893.13.F
Fel
2nd
Del Controlled Substance 200 Ft Of Public Hous
Drug9719
893.13.4b
Fel
2nd
Delivery Of Controlled Substance To A Minor
Drug9722
893.13.4b
Fel
2nd
Use Of Minor To Deliver Controlled Substance
Drug9724
893.13.1d1
Fel
1st
Delivery Of A Controlled Substance Within 1000
Drug9725
893.13.1f2
Fel
2nd
Delivery Of A Controlled Substance Within 1000
Drug9725
893.13.1f2
Fel
2nd
Delivery Of A Controlled Substance Within 1000
Drug9726
893.13.1f2
Fel
2nd
Poss W/Int To Del Cont Subs Win 1000 Pub Hous
Drug9727
893.13.1f1
Fel
1st
Possession With Intent To Deliver A Controlled
Drug9728
893.13.1d2
Fel
2nd
Delivery Of A Controlled Substance Within 1000
Drug9730
893.13.1e
Fel

Poss. Cont Sub W/Intent W/In 1000 Ft Of Sch.
Drug9730
893.13.1e
Fel

Poss. Cont Sub W/Intent W/In 1000 Ft Of Sch.
Drug9730
893.13.1e
Fel

Poss. Cont Sub W/Intent W/In 1000 Ft Of Sch.
Drug9731
893.13.1c
Fel

Poss Cont Sub Wi Sell  Manuf  Del 1000 Ft Schl
Drug9731
893.13.1c
Fel

Poss Cont Sub Wi Sell  ManufDel 1000 Ft Schl
Drug9731
893.13.1c
Fel

Poss Cont Sub Wi Sell ManufDel 1000 Ft Schl
Drug9735
893.13.1f1
Fel
1st
Sale Contr Substance W/In 200 Ft Pub Housing
Drug9740
893.13.1e
Fel

Delivery Of Cont Sub W/In 1000 Feet Of School
Drug9740
893.13.1e
Fel

Delivery Of Cont Sub W/In 1000 Feet Of School
Drug9740
893.13.1e
Fel

Delivery Of Cont Sub W/In 1000 Feet Of School
Drug9741
893.13.1c
Fel

Delivery Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of School
Drug9741
893.13.1c
Fel

Delivery Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of School
Drug9741
893.13.1c
Fel

Delivery Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of School
Drug9742
893.13.1c
Fel

Delivery Of Cont Sub W/In 1000 Feet Of School
Drug9742
893.13.1c
Fel

Delivery Of Cont Sub W/In 1000 Feet Of School
Drug9742
893.13.1c
Fel

Delivery Of Cont Sub W/In 1000 Feet Of School
Drug9743
893.13.1c
Fel

Del Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of  PublicPark
Drug9743
893.13.1c
Fel

Del Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of  PublicPark
Drug9743
893.13.1c
Fel

Del Cont Sub Within 1000 Ft Of  PublicPark
Drug9750
893.13.1e2
Fel
2nd
Controlled Substance Wthn 1000 Ft Of Convenien
Drug9751
893.13.1e1
Fel
1st
Controlled Substance Wthn 1000 Ft Of Convenien
Drug9757
893.13.1e2
Fel
2nd
Deliver Controlled Subst Wthn 1000 Ft Of Churc
Drug9758
893.131.E2
Fel
2nd
Poss With Intent To Del A Cont Sub 1000 Church
Drug9759
893.13.1e1
Fel
1st
Deliver Controlled Subs W-In 1000 Ft Of Church
Drug9760
893.13.1e1
Fel
1st
Poss Int To Del Cont Sub Win 1000 Ft Of Chrch
Drug9761
893.13.1e1
Fel
Life
Armed Possession With Intent To Deliver A Cont
Drug9762
893.13.1e2
Fel
1st
Armed Possession With Intent To Deliver A Cont
Drug9767
893.135.1h
Fel
1st
Traf Gamma Hydroxybutyric Acid  Ghb   1kil To
Drug9781
893.1351.J12b
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Phenethylamines 200 To 400 Gram
Drug9783
893.1351.K12a
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Phenethylamines 10 To 200 Grams
Drug9783
893.1351.K12a
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Phenethylamines 10 To 200 Grams
Drug9784
893.1351.K12b
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Phenethylamines 200 To 400 Gram
Drug9785
893.1351.K12c
Fel
1st
Trafficking In Phenethylamines Over 400 Grams
Drug9786
893.1351.K12c
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic Phenethylamines
Drug9787
893.1351.K12a
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Phenethylamines  10 T
Drug9787
893.1351.K12a
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Phenethylamines  10 T
Drug9788
893.1351.K12b
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Phenethylamines 200 -
Drug9788
893.1351.K12b
Fel
1st
Conspiracy To Traffic In Phenethylamines 200 -
Fel
3rd
Drug9805
893.13.8a1
Fel
3rd
Assist In Obtaining Controlled Substance By Fr
Drug9841
893.13.7a7
Misd
1st
Possession Of Blank Prescription
Drug9850
831.30.1
Misd
2nd
Fraud In Obtaining Med Drugs  Forged Pres
Drug9851
831.30.1
Misd
1st
Fraud Obtaining Medicinal Drugs  Forged Prescr
Drug9860
831.30.2
Misd
2nd
Fraud In Obtain Medicinal Drugs   Cause To Be
Drug9861
831.30.2
Misd
1st
Fraud Obtaining Medicinal Drugs Cause Forged
Drug9870
831.30.3
Misd
2nd
Fraud In Obtaining Medicinal Drugs    Uttering
Drug9871
831.30.3
Misd
1st
Fraud In Obtaining Medicinal Drugs  Uttering
Drug9873
499.0051.14d
Fel
2nd
Causing Drug To Be Counterfeit
Drug9874
499.0051.14d
Fel
2nd
Sale Of Counterfeit Drug
Drug9876
499.03.1
Misd
2nd
Possession Of Drug Without Prescription
Drug9877
499.03.1
Fel
3rd
Possession W/Intent To Sell A Drug W/O Prescri
Drug9879
465.015.2c
Fel
3rd
Dispensing Prescription Drugs Without A Prescr
Drug9880
465.015.2b
Fel
3rd
Dispensing Medicinal Drugs Wtihout Pharmacist
Drug9883
831.31.1a
Fel
3rd
Delivery Of A Counterfeit Controlled Substance
Drug9884
893.149.1b
Fel
2nd
Possession Or Distribution Of Listed Chemical
Drug9885
893.149.1a
Fel
2nd
Possession Of Listed Chemical
Drug9886
831.31.1a
Fel
3rd
Poss Of Counterfeit Contr Sub With Int To Deli
Fel
3rd
Drug9893
831.311.
Fel
3rd
Fraudulant Use Of Counterfeit-Resistant Prescr
Drug9895
893.13.7a10
Fel
3rd
False Label On Controlled Substance
Drug9995
823.10.1
Fel
3rd
Keeping Public Nuisance Structure For Drug Act
Drug9996
893.13.7a5
Misd
1st
Maintaining Structure/Place For Drug Use








Trafficking in Cannabis 25 to 2,000 Pounds | First Degree Felony | DRUG2905

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2000 pounds, 893.135, DRUG2905, Mandatory Minimum 3 Years, Trafficking in cannabis 25 to 2000
Trafficking in Cannabis 25 to 2,000 893.135
Trafficking in Cannabis over 25 pounds is a First Degree Felony punishable by at least three (3) years in the Florida State Prison. This offense is also charged in growhouse cases when there are more that three-hundred (300) plants seized by law enforcement. Forfeiture of assets is a frequent flyer by law enforcement in these cases.

Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office Major Violator's Unit investigates drug trafficking offenses in the Tampa Bay area. Charge Code DRUG2905 is used by the court system when cases involve Trafficking in Cannabis 25 to 2,000 pounds. The charge is a First Degree Felony under Florida law.

893.135 Trafficking; mandatory sentences; suspension or reduction of sentences; conspiracy to engage in trafficking.

(a) Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, in excess of 25 pounds of cannabis, or 300 or more cannabis plants, commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in cannabis,” punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. If the quantity of cannabis involved:

1. Is in excess of 25 pounds, but less than 2,000 pounds, or is 300 or more cannabis plants, but not more than 2,000 cannabis plants, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years, and the defendant shall be ordered to pay a fine of $25,000.

Law Office of W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr
2102 W Cleveland St
Tampa, Florida 33606
(813) 222-2220
centrallaw@centrallaw.com

2102 W Cleveland St Tampa, Florida 33606 (813) 222-2220
Drug Trafficking Defense Attorney Lawyer in Tampa, Florida Toll Free

Methamphetamine Case Tossed - Open Door and the Community Caretaker Function

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0
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Methamphetamine , Search and Seizure, search warrant
Warrantless entry
Medical Emergency
Community Caretaker

What Happens When Police Make a Warrantless Entry of a Home for Medical Emergency?


Treasure Island, Florida has become a hotbed of the methamphetamine world. So while on patrol, a cop saw an open door with mail on the floor near the mail slot. The decision was made to enter the home and make sure everyone was alright. Of course, while there, why not search the house and find some meth. Court says adios to this one. 

Given Central Florida's temperate weather in November, an open door at 8:00 in the morning, without more, cannot justify a warrantless entry based on a feared medical emergency or the community caretaker function.  


What happens when police make a warrantless entry of a motor vehicle?


Attorneys Note: Traffic cops use the community caretaker function to justify DUI arrests of drivers that are found sleeping in a parked car. In Florida, this is known as a DUI Actual Physical Control. You can see how a Florida Court addresses the seizure of a sleeping motorist. Sometimes the opening of a door of a sleeping driver is handled the same way the court handled this Treasure Island case where the charges are thrown out after a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress is granted.

Complete Text of Methamphetamine, Warrantless Entry, Medical Emergency, Community Caretaker Opinion


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

Case No. 2D14-5582
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,

v.        

JOHN FULTZ
Appellee.
                       
Opinion filed January 22, 2016.                 
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Chris Helinger, Judge.                   
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.                   

J. Andrew Crawford of J. Andrew Crawford, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.


SLEET, Judge.

The State appeals the order granting John Fultz's motion to suppress evidence in his criminal prosecution for possession with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver methamphetamine. In this case, we are called on to determine whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for a feared medical emergency or performance of a community caretaking function justified the warrantless entry and search of Fultz's home.  Because the police had no objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an emergency inside Fultz's residence to justify a warrantless search, we affirm.

Officer Lovelace, a patrol officer for the Treasure Island Police Department, was in the area of Fultz's townhouse at around 7:45 a.m. on November 26, 2013, where she had just completed a "house check" on a nearby home.1 Officer Lovelace testified that she had been previously contacted by a citizen who had been keeping traffic logs for Fultz's townhouse due to "suspicious foot traffic." Two weeks prior to the search at issue, Officer Hansell, a St. Petersburgpolice officer who lived in the area, told Officer Lovelace that he suspected there was drug activity at the townhouse. Further raising her suspicions, when Officer Lovelace reported for her shift roll call that morning, Patrol Sergeant DeShay informed her of unconfirmed information he received from an informant regarding a possible meth lab in the garage of the townhouse.

After conducting the requested house check, Officer Lovelace decided to drive by Fultz's townhouse, which she suspected contained a meth lab. As she was passing by, she noticed that the front door to the townhouse was open, a light was on upstairs, some mail was on the floor under the mail slot, the garage door was closed, and a car was parked in the driveway. Officer Lovelace testified that based on her suspicion of drug activity, she called for backup about a minute after observing the open door.
1Officer Lovelace testified that the residents of the home were out of town and had requested that Treasure Island police check in on their home, a service that Officer Lovelace routinely provides as a part of her patrol.

Sergeant DeShay and Officer Smallen arrived on the scene ten minutes later.  Before proceeding any further, DeShay contacted Detective Taylor in the Treasure Islandpolice drug division and informed him of the situation, but Taylor declined to join them at the scene.  Notwithstanding, based on the open door, mail, and unconfirmed reports of drug activity, the three officers decided to enter the home to conduct a "welfare check" on the residents.  Sergeant DeShay testified that he knocked on the open door, announced "police," and then entered the residence. He immediately opened the door leading into the garage and discovered signs of an active meth lab. The trial court ultimately suppressed this evidence, and this appeal ensued.

A warrantless search of a home is "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . and Article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." State v. Boyd, 615 So. 2d 786, 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (quoting Cross v. State, 469 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA1985)); see also Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006). Exigent circumstances are one such exception that may justify a warrantless search, but the police must have an objectively reasonable basis to support their actions. Vanslyke v. State, 936 So. 2d 1218, 1221-22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); see also Boyd, 615 So. 2d at 789 ("[T]o allow a warrantless entry into a person's home in an emergency situation, there must be objectively reasonable circumstances that convey to the police officer an articulable, reasonable belief that an emergency exists.").

The exigent circumstances exception is not a shortcut by which police may circumvent the requirement of a search warrant.  These exceptions are based on a police officer's ability to articulate objective facts which make the procuring of a warrant impractical. See Davis v. State, 834 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("The sine qua non of the exigent circumstances exception is 'a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.'" (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978))). "[I]f time to get a warrant exists, the enforcement agency must use that time to obtain the warrant."  Herring v. State, 168 So. 3d 240, 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), review dismissed, 173 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 1977)).

In this case, the State contends that the police were justified in entering Fultz's townhouse because they reasonably believed that the open door and scattered mail portended an emergency. Specifically, the State argues that two particular types of exigencies justified the police action in this case: the community caretaker exception and the feared medical emergency exception.

The community caretaker exception arises from the duty of police officers to "ensure the safety and welfare of the citizenry at large." Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 600 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 5.4(c), at 201-02 (4th ed. 2004)).  It is clear from our review of the record that the officers involved in this case were motivated by a desire to serve and protect the Treasure Island community. And this court has held that "the operation of a methamphetamine lab is inherently dangerous, presents an immediate threat to public safety, and is well within the scope of the exigent circumstance exception." Barth v. State, 955 So. 2d 1115, 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). However, police community caretaker functions are "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).  And to justify entry under this exigency, the police must have a reasonable belief that a meth lab is being operated within a residence "based on their experience, facts developed during investigation, and observance of [the suspect's] activities."  Barth, 955 So. 2d at 1118. 

In this case, the officers who entered Fultz's home did not have any special training related to meth labs, had not conducted any investigation into the reports of possible drug activity in the home, and had not made any observations of the residents or their activities that morning. Prior to the warrantless entry, police had not conducted any surveillance or controlled drug buys, made contact with Fultz, or initiated any other investigation into the potential criminal activity or habits of Fultz.  Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the police did not have a reasonable belief that could justify a warrantless entry under the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement.

The feared medical emergency exception "permits police to enter and investigate private premises to preserve life . . . or render first aid, provided they do not enter with an accompanying intent either to arrest or search." Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 280 (Fla. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Hornblower, 351 So. 2d at 718). This exigency recognizes that when there is a threat to safety and no time to secure a warrant, "the need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides justification for an otherwise invalid entry."  Vanslyke, 936 So. 2d at 1222 (quoting Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 279)).  However, the police must have an objectively reasonable fear that a medical emergency is occurring inside the residence.  See Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 281. 

                       The officers testified that the open door and the mail in the foyer coupled with their suspicions of an active meth lab led them to believe that someone inside had overdosed or was otherwise in need of immediate medical attention. The cases relied on by the State are distinguishable from the facts of this case because in each the officers' belief that there was an immediate need for their entry into the residence to address a medical emergency was based on more than just an open door, mail, and unconfirmed and uninvestigated reports of drug activity. See, e.g., State v. Shillingford, 136 So. 3d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that exigent circumstances existed when officers summoned to investigate a domestic battery "arrived and observed [a] blood trail leading to [the defendant's] apartment[] and heard moaning coming from within the apartment"); Davis, 834 So. 2d 322 (holding that warrantless entry was lawful when a neighbor, who called police about a possible burglary, reported an open front door and the resident's dog was wandering outside and police observed signs of forced entry). In this case, the officers were not summoned to the residence for concerns regarding the residence or its occupants, did not see any blood or evidence of possible criminal activity, did not hear anything within the residence that would lead the officers to reasonably conclude that someone in the residence was in distress, and observed no signs of forced entry. The officers conducted no investigation into the unconfirmed reports of a meth lab on the premises and witnessed nothing consistent with the presence of a meth lab. There was nothing that could have led the officers to form an objectively reasonable belief that there was an ongoing medical emergency in the residence that required their immediate assistance.
 
We agree with the trial court that the Treasure Island Police Department's expressed policy of entering a home when they observe an open door and the residents fail to answer their hail is constitutionally troubling. There are many reasons that a citizen could leave a door to their home open; an open front door alone is not enough to support a reasonable belief that an exigency exists and cannot justify a warrantless entry into a residence.  See, e.g., Kyer v. Commonwealth, 612 S.E.2d 213, 217 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an open door on an August night absent some other reason for concern could not support a reasonable belief that would justify entry under the exigent circumstances doctrine); State v. Christenson, 45 P.3d 511, 513 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) ("[A]n open door on a summer morning is not, in and of itself, a circumstance that could give rise to a reasonable belief that entry is necessary to prevent harm to persons or property. It is simply too common an event to create a concern of harm in the absence of other signs of trouble."). Given Central Florida's temperate weather in November, an open door at 8:00 in the morning, without more, cannot justify a warrantless entry based on a feared medical emergency or the community caretaker function.  As explained in Hornblower, the police may not "approach a dwelling, armed only with their own subjective suspicion that illegal activity was afoot, and wait for some . . . justification to break down the door and burst into the dwelling."  351 So. 2d at 718.

Accordingly, we affirm the order granting the motion to suppress.
Affirmed.  

WALLACE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur. 

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Constructive Possession of Cocaine in Florida - Conviction Tossed

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Constructive Possession, Possession of Cocaine
Constructive Possession of Cocaine in
Florida - Conviction Tossed

What happens in a typical Constructive of Possession of Cocaine Case in Florida?


Here are excerpts from what a constructive possession appeals court court just did in Tampa Bay, Florida:

In March 2014, Manatee County Sheriff's deputies were called to a motel in Bradentonto investigate a possible robbery.  When they arrived, they encountered the victim who informed them she had been robbed by Edwards and his friend, Rachel Simms.  The officers located Edwards and Simms in a motel room and interviewed them.  During the investigation, the officers discovered a car key for a vehicle parked outside.  One of the officers had seen Edwards sitting in the driver's seat of the vehicle a couple of hours prior to the robbery call.  As a result, the officers asked Edwards for consent to search the vehicle.  Edwards notified the officers that he did not own the vehicle but instead had borrowed it.  The officers then obtained consent from the owner of the vehicle, but the owner advised the officers that the key found in the motel room would only work in the vehicle's ignition.  It would not open the vehicle because the vehicle was equipped with a combination lock.  The owner gave the officers the combination to unlock the vehicle, but the evidence reflected that Edwards knew the combination as well.

During the search of the vehicle, one of the officers located a gray canvas bag under the driver's seat.  Inside that bag was a wallet that contained Edwards's identification card as well as a bail bond receipt bearing the name of "Joanne A. Simms."  The robbery victim's identification card was also found in the canvas bag along with a few other items that contained no identifying information.  The police report reflected that there was a smaller purple bag inside the canvas bag and inside that smaller bag was a plastic baggie containing rock cocaine.  The officer who found the cocaine testified that there was indeed a purple bag inside the canvas bag despite the fact that there was no purple bag submitted into evidence at the sheriff's office.
 "While this case does present circumstances that could be interpreted as incriminating, those circumstances can also be construed as being consistent with . . . innocence." 

  

Edwards was arrested and charged with robbery with a firearm and possession of cocaine.  At trial, Simms testified regarding the events leading up to and including the alleged robbery.  However, her testimony revealed some inconsistencies regarding exactly when she had been inside the vehicle in question.  She at first admitted going with Edwards and the victim to get cigarettes, but she subsequently denied being in the vehicle on the day of the alleged robbery.  However, Edwards testified that on the relevant date, he, Simms, and the victim all got into the vehicle and went to a local convenience store to obtain cigarettes.  He testified that Simms drove the vehicle there.  He denied possessing the cocaine, and there was no evidence presented regarding ownership of the canvas bag or the purple bag within the canvas bag.  There was also no fingerprint evidence submitted.
 

Edwards moved for judgment of acquittal arguing that the vehicle had been jointly occupied and that the State had failed to present independent proof that Edwards had knowledge of the cocaine and the ability to maintain dominion or control over it.  He proffered that it was possible that Simms or the victim placed the cocaine in the bag.  His motion was denied.

Ultimately, the jury acquitted Edwards of the armed robbery charge but found him guilty of the possession charge.  He was sentenced to a suspended five-year prison sentence and placed on one year of community control followed by two years of probation.  His license was also suspended, and a community service requirement was imposed. 


Why did the Florida Court Reverse the Drug Crime Conviction?


We employ de novo review over the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal.  See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002).  We will only reverse if the conviction is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See id.  Yet "[w]here, as here, the evidence of the defendant's guilt is entirely circumstantial, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence."  Bennett v. State, 46 So. 3d 1181, 1183 (Fla.2d DCA 2010) (citing State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989)).

What does the Prosecutor Need to Prove to establish Possession of Cocaine in a Drug Crimes Case?

Here, Edwards was not found in physical possession of the cocaine and thus the State's case was predicated on constructive possession.  The State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Edwards knew of the presence of the cocaine and had the ability to exercise dominion and control over it.  Bennett, 46 So. 3d at 1184; Jacksonv. State, 995 So. 2d 535, 539 (Fla.2d DCA 2008).  "The surrounding circumstances must support the inference of a 'conscious and substantial possession by the accused, as distinguished from a mere involuntary or superficial possession.'"  Jackson, 995 So. 2d at 539 (quoting Reynolds v. State, 111 So. 285, 286 (Fla.1926)).  "Mere proximity to contraband, without more, is legally insufficient to prove possession."  Id.(quoting Pena v. State, 465 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)).
 
"As our case law has made clear, a defendant's knowledge and control of contraband may be inferred where there are incriminating circumstances beyond mere proximity from which a jury could infer those elements."
The evidence failed to show that Edwards had knowledge of the presence of or had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the cocaine.  Although he admitted borrowing the car, knew the combination to unlock it, and had been seen sitting in the driver's seat a couple of hours prior to the alleged robbery, he was not with the vehicle when the officers arrived.  Further, there was evidence presented that Simms and the victim had been in the vehicle with Edwards that day and that Simms had actually driven the vehicle.  

What happens in Drug Possession cases when the vehicle has multiple occupants?

Where the area in which drugs are found is in joint, rather than exclusive possession, a defendant's "knowledge of the contraband's presence and the ability to control it will not be inferred from the ownership but must be established by independent proof."  Jackson, 995 So. 2d at 539 (quoting Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1983)).  This can be done either "through 'evidence that the defendant had actual knowledge of the presence of the contraband or evidence of incriminating statements or circumstances, other than simple proximity to the contraband, from which the jury could infer the defendant's knowledge' of the contraband."  Id.(quoting Wagner v. State, 950 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla.2d DCA 2007)).  "An inference of knowledge and dominion and control may . . . arise where the contraband located in [a] jointly occupied [area] is found in or about other personal property which is shown to be owned or controlled by the defendant."  Id. 

What happens in a Possession of Cocaine Case where the area that drugs were found was Jointly Occupied? 

However, in this case, the cocaine was found in an area that the evidence reflected had been jointly occupied, and the cocaine was found near personal property which was shown to be owned or controlled by at least three people including Edwards.  The victim's identification card was located inside the gray canvas bag, and a bail bond receipt bearing the name of "Joanne A. Simms" was found inside Edwards's wallet.  Consequently, under these limited circumstances, we refuse to apply an inference of Edwards's knowledge of the presence of and dominion and control over the cocaine.  Cf. Jackson, 995 So. 2d at 540-41 (holding that surrounding circumstances were sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that the drugs contained in a change purse located near the defendant were known to him and were under his dominion and control where the change purse appeared to have spilled from a larger purse, the defendant was known to carry a purse and there were no other purses in the dwelling, the defendant's identification was found inside a cigarette case that also appeared to have spilled from the purse, and there was no evidence in or around the purse or the change purse that they belonged to anyone other than defendant). 

What does a Florida Court do where there is a defense based upon a jointly occupied vehicle?

This court has previously reversed a conviction based on constructive possession where a defendant was in a jointly occupied vehicle and drugs were located near his personal belongings but the items were in an area to which the other passengers had equal access.1  See, e.g., S.B. v. State, 657 So. 2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that evidence was not inconsistent with the defendant's theory that   someone put marijuana in his bag where the bag was located inside the trunk and the marijuana was found inside another container that was inside the defendant's bag, where multiple people had access to the bag, and where the defendant disclaimed ownership of the container).  This is such a case.

What do Florida Courts do when there is a Jointly Occupied House?

Similar dispositions have occurred where drugs were found concealed near a defendant's personal property inside jointly occupied houses.  See, e.g., Bennett, 46 So. 3d at 1183 (holding in relevant part that the State failed to prove constructive possession of drugs found inside a cardboard box where defendant's shirt was found because there was no evidence to prove who owned the other clothes in the box and defendant had a reasonable hypothesis that he threw his shirt on top of the box without knowing that the drugs were inside); N.K.W., Jr. v. State, 788 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding evidence was insufficient to establish constructive possession where, although drugs were found in a plastic bag inside defendant's wallet, defendant was never asked if the bag belonged to him, no fingerprints were lifted from the bag, defendant denied ownership of the bag, and multiple people had access to the room where his wallet was located); Evans v. State, 32 So. 3d 188, 189-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that the State failed to prove constructive possession where drugs were hidden in a pain reliever bottle inside a small toiletry bag, which was itself inside a duffel bag that also contained the defendant's passport, but where no one was in actual possession of the duffel bag at the time of the search, multiple people had access to the room where the bag was found, no fingerprints were found on the duffel bag or pain reliever bottle, and no one was asked about ownership of the pill bottle).

The proximity of Edwards's identification to the purple bag in which the cocaine was concealed might be consistent with his having knowledge of the cocaine and dominion and control over it.  Yet those facts are equally susceptible to the reasonable hypothesis that the cocaine was in the possession and control of Simms or the victim while they were in the vehicle and that Edwards simply threw his wallet into the gray canvas bag without knowing that the cocaine was inside.  See Bennett, 46 So. 3d at 1184.  Indeed, there was no evidence presented as to when the cocaine was placed in the purple bag or when the purple bag was placed inside the gray canvas bag.  See Evans v. State, 32 So. 3d 188, 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (noting that presence of the defendant's passport in duffel bag suggests he placed it there, but explaining that "[s]uch an inference . . . provides no time frame with regard to when the contraband came to reside in the bag, nor any help as to appellant's present dominion over the contraband" and, therefore, the "mere presence of the passport" was insufficient to establish defendant's constructive possession).  The lack of a time frame for placement of the cocaine in either bag, combined with the lack of evidence regarding ownership of either bag, the lack of fingerprint evidence, and the fact that items belonging to persons other than Edwards were also located in the gray canvas bag lead us to conclude that the State's circumstantial evidence failed to prove that Edwards was in constructive possession of the cocaine.possession of the cocaine.possession of the cocaine. While this case does present circumstances that could be interpreted as incriminating, those circumstances can also be construed as being consistent with Edwards's hypothesis of innocence.
 

Reversed and remanded with instructions. 

What does a Florida Court do where there is a defense based upon a jointly occupied house?

We emphasize that it was the combination of these factors that requires us to reverse the judgment in this case.  We do not intend for this opinion to be interpreted as requiring reversal whenever drugs are located near a defendant's personal items that are commingled with personal items belonging to someone else.  As our case law has made clear, a defendant's knowledge and control of contraband may be inferred where there are incriminating circumstances beyond mere proximity from which a jury could infer those elements.  See Jackson, 995 So. 2d at 539.  

Source: 

http://www.2dca.org/opinions/Opinion_Pages/Opinion_Pages_2016/February/February%2012,%202016/2D15-612.pdf
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